Robert Ripley launched his franchise Believe It or Not in 1919, offering readers bizarre and little-known facts as entertainment and challenge to received knowledge or wisdom. He employed dogged researchers to uncover and publish the little or unknown bits of trivia to gain attention and entertain. Believing or not believing, it is noted, was explicit as the iconic title of the feature states.
That which Ripley spawned was neither theology nor credo but entertainment and, perhaps, some intellectual stimulus to promote curiosity. It was a far different manifestation than that of the conspiracy-plagued dialogue passing in our national discourse today. Some few may be familiar with the term “jury nullification,” wherein a verdict is rendered by a panel of peers in apparent contradiction to the evidence presented.
The Age of Reason emerged in the 18th century following the predominance of mysticism and myths of the Middle Ages. Before his emigration to the United States in 1802, Thomas Paine authored The Age of Reason (1794), in which he clarified the role of religion and blind reliance upon faith in society, concluding:
Infidelity does not consist in believing, or in disbelieving [religion]; it consists in professing to believe what he does not believe.
Rationality, informed by scientific discovery and invention, began to replace superstition and freed imagination to pursue ideas without restriction. Researchers and scientists studying child development have generally concluded that youth around the age of seven, give or take a year, start to grasp the difference between right and wrong, also realizing that others have independent feelings from their own.
Rationality, informed by scientific discovery and invention, began to replace superstition and freed imagination to pursue ideas without restriction. Researchers and scientists studying child development have generally concluded that youth around the age of seven, give or take a year, start to grasp the difference between right and wrong, also realizing that others have independent feelings from their own. These two polar measures have been relied upon as valid criteria upon which to entrust institutions and institutional processes. They are hallmarks of national discourse which, in turn, was informed by media, political leaders, school teachers, parents, and other providers and transmitters of information and values.
There is no date certain when this paradigm began to disintegrate and become subject to a highway free-for-all of doubt. QAnon’s appearance traces to 2017 on the Internet and has become the most visible and recognized source of conspiracy theories. The Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a highly regarded reporter, fielded four separate surveys over 2021 measuring the proportions of Americans crediting QAnon messages. PRRI posed three propositions to respondents:
- The government, media, and financial worlds in the U.S. are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex-trafficking operation.
- There is a storm coming soon that will sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders.
- Because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.
In summary, the results across the four surveys reveal that about “one in five Americans mostly or completely agree that there is a storm coming (22%); that violence might be necessary to save our country (18%); and that the government, media, and financial worlds are controlled by Satan-worshipping pedophiles (16%).” The percentages translate, according to the study, into over 40 million of a total population of 325 million.
PRRI further analyzed its research along a more refined evaluation of QAnon respondents:
- Believers who completely or mostly agreed with the three statements,
- Doubters who mostly disagreed with the statements, and
- Rejectors who completely disagreed with all three statements.
This analysis showed that 16% of Americans were “believers;” 48% were “doubters;” and 34% were “rejectors.” When interpolated in political party beliefs, the data, according to PRRI, show that
“One in four Republicans (25%), compared to 14% of independents and 9% of Democrats, identify as QAnon believers. Nearly half of Republicans (47%) who most trust far-right news outlets like One America News Network or Newsmax are QAnon believers, along with one-quarter of Republicans who most trust Fox News (26%) or do not trust TV news (26%). Fewer (18%) of Republicans who most trust mainstream media outlets like CNN, MSNBC, public television, or broadcast news are QAnon believers.”
These findings strongly depict the silo/echo chamber effect noted by many commentators with respect to the process of reinforcement of beliefs among respondents. Once, it was sufficient to be able to rely upon neighbors, broadcasters, and public figures for the transmission of credible, reliable information for consumption. Rejection or cynicism at the nexus of interface without consideration or evaluation poses substantial obstacles to the institutions and institutional processes formerly relied upon. Acronyms (LMS/lamestream media) now are the shorthand disparagement repeated in the echo chambers as a substitute for criticism. At the same time, a few news outlets have gained audiences through association with QAnon lexicographic narratives.
The age of reason envisioned by Thomas Paine for the larger society and that studied by child development science are clearly suffering a powerful, perhaps permanent, setback in self-sustenance, reliance, and evolution. The proportions of believers in conspiracy information speak to a deep, pervasive “jury nullification” in place of common sense evidence, one that is certain to devolve upon younger citizens.
The age of reason envisioned by Thomas Paine for the larger society and that studied by child development science are clearly suffering a powerful, perhaps permanent, setback in self-sustenance, reliance, and evolution. The proportions of believers in conspiracy information speak to a deep, pervasive “jury nullification” in place of common sense evidence, one that is certain to devolve upon younger citizens.
At this juncture in civil discourse, it is difficult to assess what might restore a measure of trust in the dialogue that is directed toward us and in which we participate. The numbers and proportions of those whose reliance upon conspiracy disbelief are daunting. The latent effect of the extent of disbelief threatens the fiber of values previously extant. The demise of civic trust replaced by rumor, conspiracy, and mysticism appears to be unrelenting and perhaps even impervious to countermeasures, including truth. Are Americans predisposed to this malady, this nullification of reason? If so, why?
If there is an answer to that question, there is hope for an antidote. In the meantime, the tone and tenor of civil discourse seems likely to continue to be bitter and divisive, with the potential for QAnon’s (or its allied sources) vitality continuing to prosper.
The ultimate teleology here is nihilism: the rejection or nullification of all civic, religious, and moral principles in the belief that life itself is meaningless. QAnon and its allies and progeny are not interested in the option of “or not” believing that quality is the most dangerous of all.
Categories: cultural icons, democrats, Issues, National, political discourse, politics, press, republicans, State
Join the discussion!